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Noise causes severe difficulties in implementing quantum computing and quantum cryptography.
Several schemes have been suggested to reduce this problem, mainly focusing on quantum com-
putation. Motivated by quantum cryptography, we suggest a coding which uses N quantum bits
(N = n2) to encode one quantum bit, and reduces the error exponentially with n. Our result sug-
gests the possibility of distributing a secure key over very long distances, and maintaining quantum
states for very long times. It also provides a new quantum privacy amplification against a strong
adversary.
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The ability to correct errors in a quantum bit (qubit)
is crucial to the success of quantum computing, and it is
very important to the success of quantum cryptography.
Motivated by quantum computing, Shor [1] shows that
quantum errors can be corrected (in some analogy to clas-
sical error correction [2]). The many works which follow
Shor’s idea focus on improving his result [3–6] to better
fit the requirements of quantum computing, or to pro-
vide a better understanding of the properties of the error-
correction codes (the previous works and also [7–9]). In
this work we apply this idea to quantum cryptography,
where reducing the error rate is the main aim. We em-
phasize the properties of quantum error-correction which
are relevant to quantum cryptography, and we show that
quantum cryptography can be tremendously improved
using a simple generalization of Shor’s scheme.
Quantum cryptography [10] has already taken some
promising experimental steps [11], and, to certain limits,
it can work without involving the complications added
by error-correction (or more precisely, error-reduction)
schemes. In reality, there is noise due to preparing, trans-
mitting and receiving the quantum states, and practi-
cal protocols deal with small error-rates. However, the
noise still causes a severe problem due to the combina-
tion of the following two reasons: (1) The information
available to an eavesdropper (Eve) on a single bit de-
pends on the error-rate which the legitimate users (Alice
and Bob) accept [12,13], and reducing this error-rate re-
duces Eve’s information on the final key. Moreover, secu-
rity analysis (e.g., [13]) is restricted to small error rates,
and removing this restriction might make the analysis
(technically) impossible. (2i) Existing error-rates do not
allow key distribution over long distances, due to error
accumulation over distance. This is the main problem
of practical quantum key distribution, and currently [11]
the best existing systems distribute a key to distances
of up to 30 km. The scheme we present here might en-
able one to increase this distance significantly, suggest-
ing that a lot of effort should be spent on this direction.
(2ii) Some quantum cryptographic schemes [14,15] use
quantum memory instead of (or in addition to) quan-
tum channels. Reducing the errors in such schemes is
important since it allows keeping the states unchanged
for a desirable time. (This was partly suggested in [16];
a discussion of related works is done in the concluding
paragraph.) Moreover, the quantum cryptographic net-
work [15] which allows communication between any two
users (while using no quantum channels between them)
already uses the same experimental ingredients as error-
reduction schemes. Therefore, improving quantum cryp-
tography in the future, using error-reduction schemes,
might make such a scheme favorite.
The error-reduction scheme we suggest here allows, in
principle, to reduce the noise in a transmission channel or
in a quantum memory to any desirable level. This result
is important (from a theoretical point of view) for im-
plementing a “quantum privacy amplification” scheme,
as an alternative to another quantum privacy amplifica-
tion scheme [17] which is based on purification of singlet-
pairs [18]. Such schemes provide a promising direction for
proving the ultimate security of quantum cryptography,
as an alternative to the more practical approach of [13].
Classical error-correction is based on redundant encod-
ing which uses more than one bit (on average) to encode
one bit. The simplest scheme is the 1→ 3 repetition code
in which each bit is repeated three times in the encoding,
and a majority vote is chosen for decoding. In this case,
if a single bit contains an error with probability p (where
p is small), and pl =
(
3
l
)
pl(1 − p)3−l is the probability
of having exactly l errors, then the probability to have a
remainder error (the probability of having two or three
errors in three bits) is P = p2 + p3 = 3(1 − p)p2 + p3 =
3p2 − 2p3. One must keep in mind that this result is
true on average, but in case we know that one error was
identified and corrected [which happens with probability
p2+ p1 = 3p
2(1− p) + 3p(1− p)2] the probability of hav-
ing a remainder error is exactly p2/(p1+ p2) = p, and we
gain no error reduction at all!
The analogous quantum error-correction [1] uses 9
qubits to encode a single qubit (to perfectly correct a
single error) using the following procedure: a 1→ 3 rep-
etition code in the z basis |0〉 → |000〉 and |1〉 → |111〉
(where |000〉 stands for the tensor product |0〉|0〉|0〉 of
three qubits); a transformation to the x basis |0〉 →
(1/
√
2)(|0〉 + |1〉) and |1〉 → (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉) for each
qubit; and finally, again a 1 → 3 repetition code in the
(new) z basis. All together, the encoding is:
|0〉 → 1√
8
(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉) ,
|1〉 → 1√
8
(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉) . (1)
We denote it as R3UR3 where Rn stands for 1 → n
repetition code, and U for rotation from the z basis to
the x basis.
For cryptographic purposes, one is interested in error-
reduction schemes, which leave a minimal remainder er-
ror, rather than in error-correction schemes, which leave
a higher remainder error. For that aim, the majority vote
decoding should be replaced by an unanimous decision;
in case of a disagreement the bit is thrown away. The
classical (1 → n) repetition code Rn with n = 2t + 1
provides successful unanimous decision with probability
Q = (1−p)n+pn, and the remainder error in this case is
P = pn/Q which is P ≈
(
p
1−p
)n
for small p. This code
can also be used to correct up to t errors, but with a much
higher (average) remainder error, which can be calculated
from the binomial expansion of [p+(1−p)]n. However, if
exactly t errors were identified and corrected, the prob-
ability that there were actually t + 1 errors (hence, a
remainder error) is p.
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For n = 3 the remainder error in the error-reduction
scheme is P ≈ p3 + 3p4 which is much improved in com-
parison to the (average) remainder error in case of error-
correction, and even the n = 2 error-reduction code pro-
vides a remainder error P ≈ p2+3p3 which is better than
3p2 − p3 for small p. This was first noted by Vaidman,
Goldenberg and Wiesner (VGW) [16] who presented the
quantum error-reduction scheme R2UR2 to improve the
remainder error while using only 4 qubits instead of 9
for the encoding. The error-reduction process is done
by projecting the state of the code qubits on a desir-
able subspace; for instance, in case of the n = 3 quan-
tum error-reduction code, it is projected on the subspace
spanned by the two states of eq. 1. If the projection fails,
the qubit is not corrected but is thrown away. Throwing
the bits has only small influence on a quantum key dis-
tribution protocol since the legitimate users throw away
most of the bits due to other reasons. Note that this is
not appropriate for quantum computing, where throwing
one bit in the computing process destroys the computa-
tion. On the other hand, for cryptographic purposes, the
number of bits used for the decoding is less important (in
comparison to the requirements of quantum computing),
since neither of the existing protocols makes use of the
coherence of more than two particles.
Error-correction can be easily combined into an error-
reduction scheme for the price of increasing the remain-
der error P . The benefit of such a combination is that the
probability of successful projection, Q, is increased. For
simplicity we shall consider only “pure” error-reduction
scheme, but our scheme can be generalized to combine
the correction of few bits as well. In a scheme which com-
bines error-reduction and (t′-errors) error-correction, one
has to check into which subspace the state is projected,
and if this subspace corresponds to t′ errors (or less) the
state is corrected by simple transformations (see [1] etc.).
We conclude that the codes which are used for quan-
tum error-correction must be modified to provide error
reduction in order to fit the requirements of quantum
cryptography much better. For example, we suggest to
use error-reduction codes RnURn with large n. Such
codes encode one qubit into N = n2 qubits, in order to
reduce the error-rates exponentially with n (more effi-
cient codes could be used as well, based, for instance,
on [5,7,6]). The rest of this paper is devoted to the anal-
ysis of these codes. As in all discussions on quantum
error-correction, coherent transformations of many par-
ticles are dismissed since, in real channels, such errors are
much smaller than errors in individual bits. However, we
consider also eavesdropping aspects, and therefore, this
issue is more subtle and we elaborate it further later on.
It is generally believed that it is enough to correct
phase errors, bit errors and bit-phase errors in order to
protect against any independent error (see the analysis
in [3,8]). The intuitive problem with such argument is the
assumption that each qubit is either strongly disturbed
(due to bit flip in some basis) or not disturbed at all,
while in reality, all qubits are slightly changed. Follow-
ing [1,8,3,16,5,7] and other works on this subject we find
the remainder error P and the probability of success Q
given that bit errors, phase errors and phase-bit errors
occur with probability p. However, for the simple special
case of the code R2UR2 we demonstrate the error reduc-
tion explicitly by discussing a general transformation on
each bit.
A qubit is described by a two-dimensional Hilbert
space (say, spin of a spin-half particle) α|0〉 + β|1〉 with
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1. When it is encoded using Rn we get the
state |Ψ
R
〉 = α|0
R
〉 + β|1
R
〉 in a 2n dimensional Hilbert
space, with |0
R
〉 = |0102 · · · 0n〉 and |1R〉 = |1112 · · · 1n〉.
When it is encodes using RnURn we get the state
|Ψ
RUR
〉 = α|0
RUR
〉+ β|1
RUR
〉 of N = n2 qubits in a 2(n2)
dimensional Hilbert space, with
|0
RUR
〉 =
(
1
(
√
2)n
)
(|01 · · · 0n〉+ |11 · · · 1n〉)
(|01 · · · 0n〉+ |11 · · · 1n〉) . . . (|01 · · · 0n〉+ |11 · · · 1n〉)
|1
RUR
〉 =
(
1
(
√
2)n
)
(|01 · · · 0n〉 − |11 · · · 1n〉)
(|01 · · · 0n〉 − |11 · · · 1n〉) . . . (|01 · · · 0n〉 − |11 · · · 1n〉) (2)
where there are n multiplets of n bits each. In the decod-
ing process, the disturbed state is projected on the desir-
able 2-dimensional subspace spanned by the two states
|0
RUR
〉 and |1
RUR
〉. Let us see the influence of the dif-
ferent types of errors on the final state. (1) Bit errors:
Opening the parentheses, it is easily seen that bit-errors
in less then n bits cannot bring the state back into the
desirable subspace. (2) Phase errors: It is not easy to
calculate the number of phase errors which can bring
the state back to the relevant subspace, if we use the
z basis; however, phase errors in the z basis are bit er-
rors in the x basis (see [1,9], etc.). Therefore by trans-
forming this state to the x basis of each qubit, the two
states |0
RUR
〉 and |1
RUR
〉 become superposed from differ-
ent words which differ by at least n bits, and thus, n
phase errors are required in order to bring the original
state back to the relevant subspace. (3) Phase-bit errors:
Showing that only n such errors bring the state back to
the desirable subspace is done using the same approach,
by a transformation to the y basis. We conclude that
the probability of success and the remainder error are in-
deed Q ≈ (1 − p)n and P ≈ pn/Q, as calculated for the
classical error reduction scheme Rn.
We now provide a partial analysis of more realistic type
of errors. Let each qubit in the code be transformed ar-
bitrarily (but independently). In general, the transfor-
mation is not unitary since an ancila (e.g., environment)
might be involved. However, we can still deal only with
unitary transformations and the effect of decoherence
(non-unitary transformations) is obtained by averaging
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over several different unitary transformations with ap-
propriate probabilities. A similar argument is provided
in [8]. Restricting ourselves to “pure” error-reduction
schemes, we must demand that all the individual unitary
transformations be weak (close to unity). In a generaliza-
tion of our scheme which correct t′ errors, up to t′′ (which
is somewhat smaller than t′) of the transformations are
permitted not to be weak.
We provide a complete analysis only for the code
R2UR2, but such analysis can be extended to codes
RnURn with n > 2. Let each qubit j in the code be
exposed to the most general one-particle transformation
Uj =
(
cos θj sin θje
iφj
− sin θjeiηj cos θei(φj+ηj)
)
(3)
(up to an irrelevant overall phase), where all angles are
smaller than some small angle χ, so that p ≈ χ2. We
write how the original state |Ψ
RUR
〉 in the 2(22) = 16 di-
mensional Hilbert space is transformed (due to the ma-
trix elements 〈0000|U1U2U3U4|0011〉 etc.):

α+ β
0
0
α− β
0
·
α− β
0
0
α+ β


→


x0000
x0001
x0010
x0011
x0101
·
x1100
x1101
x1110
x1111


, (4)
with x0000 = (α + β) cos θ1 cos θ2 cos θ3 cos θ4 + (α −
β) cos θ1 cos θ2 sin θ3 sin θ4e
iφ3eiφ4 + (α −
β) sin θ1 sin θ2 cos θ3 cos θ4e
iφ1eiφ2 +
(α + β) sin θ1 sin θ2 sin θ3 sin θ4e
iφ1eiφ2eiφ3eiφ4 etc. Pro-
jecting the state onto the subspace spanned by |0
RUR
〉 =
(1/2)(|0000〉 + |0011〉 + |1100〉 + |1111〉) and |1
RUR
〉 =
(1/2)(|0000〉 − |0011〉 − |1100〉 + |1111〉), and defining
C = (cos θ1 · · · cos θ4 cosφ1 · · · cosφ4 cos η1 · · · cos η4),
we obtain, after a lengthy calculation, the (unnormal-
ized) final state |Φ
RUR
〉 = C
[(
α
β
)
+ O(χ2)
]
. The final
state, when normalized, is almost identical to the initial
state |Ψ
RUR
〉, where the terms which contribute to the
correction are sin θ1 sin θ2; sin η3 sin η4, etc., all of order
O(χ2) or smaller. Thus, the remainder error probability
is indeed O(χ4) ≈ O(p2), with probability of success C2.
This code can be used for t′-bit error-correction scheme
if we do not reject the encoded bit when the projection
fails. Instead, we check into which subspace the state is
projected. In this case the assumption that all angles are
small can be dismissed, so that t′′ (which is smaller than
t′) angles can be large. Recall however that in these cases
the remainder error-rate is not O(χ2n) anymore.
The main problem of a scheme which performs only
error reduction is that the probability of successful pro-
jection diminishes when n is increased as (1 − p)n. We
could combine it with some (small-t′) error-correction as
previously explained, but there is also a different solution,
which should be preferable in case the noise changes in
time as θ ≈ wt etc. In this case the probability of suc-
cess can be much improved using the Zeno effect (see
discussion in [16,19]) by performing M projections in be-
tween, at equal time steps, reducing p to p/(M2), and
Q to (1 − P
M2
)nM ≈ 1 − np/M . The remainder error
is also much improved by this process. Performing M
projections is rather simple when enhancing a quantum
memory is considered (meaning that it does not add any
further complication). When transmission to long dis-
tances is considered, Alice and Bob need to have “pro-
jection stations” between them. This greatly improves Q
and does not affect the security of the transmission. In-
deed, since each such station is only required to perform
the desired projection, it can even be controlled by the
eavesdropper; if Eve tries to do anything other than the
required projections — she increases the error-rate and
will be detected.
The only assumption required for the success of any
error-correction or error-reduction scheme is that each
code bit is disturbed independently of the others. If real
noise causes many-particle transformations the scheme
will fail, but for bits stored or transmitted separately,
such effects are expected to be negligible. Thus, the le-
gitimate users of quantum cryptography can use error-
reduction schemes to decrease much of the noise, and, as
a result, expect much less errors when comparing a por-
tion of the data. It is important to note that the added
assumption does not restrict the adversary, Eve. She
is still allowed to do whatever she likes, including creat-
ing many-particle coherence. The eavesdropping analysis
needs only to take the final error-rate into account. We
could even let Eve do all the transformations from the
initial bit, through the encoding till she obtains the final
bit. If she deviates from the protocols and the error-rate
is larger than expected Alice and Bob quit the transmis-
sion. If she deviates from the protocol but provides the
final state with the allowed error-rate, Alice and Bob do
not care which operations she has done, since the allowed
small error-rate (which is verified), promises them that
her information is limited as desired. This provides a new
type of a privacy amplification scheme, simpler than the
one recently suggested [17] which is based on purifica-
tion of singlets [18]. Such schemes provide a proof of the
ultimate security of quantum cryptography under the as-
sumption that the legitimate users have perfect devices.
Moreover, in case Eve gets the code bits without knowing
which code bits encode a particular qubit, her informa-
tion is reduced even more. This argument is similar to
the randomization argument used in [13,17]. It may pro-
vide the proof of perfect security even when Alice and
Bob have real devices, since Eve cannot know which co-
herence would be useful to her in advance, hence, her
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information is reduced whether the legitimate users can
observe this reduction or not! However, analyzing this
aspect of quantum privacy amplification is rather com-
plicated and it is beyond the scopes of this work.
In conclusion, we have shown that quantum cryptog-
raphy can be much improved by using quantum error-
reduction schemes. Our result might be crucial for imple-
menting quantum cryptography over large scale distances
and times. It also provides an alternative quantum pri-
vacy amplification scheme. We suggested a specific en-
coding which yields exponentially small remainder error,
and we suggested to implement it in a “many-stations”
system, so that the probability of success will not become
too small. The errors due to the frequent projections in
a “many-stations” system were not considered here. As
in the case of a fault-tolerant calculations [9], it may well
be that there is some optimal number of stationsM such
that a larger number of stations causes an increase of
the remainder error. Note also that some errors are due
to creation and measurement of the state in the labs of
Alice and Bob, and for the time being these limits our
ability to reduce P . However, the main limitations on
quantum cryptography are maintaining coherence over
long distances and times and these limitations are solved
efficiently using the scheme we suggest.
¿From all works which recently appeared, the work of
VGW [16] is more related to ours than the others. It con-
siders the use of the quantum Zeno effect and the R2UR2
error-reduction scheme to maintain quantum states in a
quantum memory for a longer time. However, this work
does not deal with the benefits of using a large number
of code bits, and with improving transmission to large
distances. Other less related works are these of [8,3]
which discusses quantum communication, and these of
Steane [5,7] which discusses large n.
The author is grateful to Gilles Brassard and Asher
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Cohen, Lior Goldenberg and Lev Vaidman for very help-
ful discussions.
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